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Abstract:	This	paper	outlines	the	first	stages	of	a	research	project	mapping	the	cyber	threat	landscape.	The	
proliferation	and	interconnection	of	networked	devices	and	the	ever-growing	numbers	of	users	able	to	
damage	(accidentally	or	deliberately)	the	integrity	of	this	system	of	systems	leads	to	cyber	security	adopting	a	
reactive	and	defensive	stance,	in	which	we	devise	policy	on	the	basis	of	what	has	happened,	rather	than	what	
may	happen,	or	what	we	pray	will	never	happen.	Simultaneously,	the	growth	of	the	domain	leads	to	silo	
thinking,	and	a	lack	of	communication	between	public	and	private,	civilian	and	military	sectors;	there	is	a	need	
for	a	synoptic	examination	of	the	field,	pooling	the	knowledge	of	practitioners	from	across	the	discipline.	
	
This	paper	will	present	the	development	of	the	initial	proof	of	concept	study,	outlining:	
	
a. use	of	a	blended	methodology,	combining	automated	quantitative	analysis	(via	Corpus	Linguistics	
tools)	with	qualitative	study	(via	Critical	Discourse	Analysis);	
b. ethical	issues	involved	in	obtaining,	storing,	and	handling	of	the	data;	
c. a	discussion	of	initial	hypotheses;	
d. the	intended	plan	of	campaign	for	moving	the	project	from	pilot	stage	to	its	full	scope;		
e. proposals	as	to	how	this	project	may	act	as	a	driver	for	innovation	and	greater	resilience	in	devising	
effective	cyber	security	policy.	
	
Mediaeval	maps	often	contained	blank	space,	labelled	'Terra	Incognita'	and	'Here	Be	Monsters';	this	project	
will	develop	a	more	detailed	cartography	of	the	threat	landscape	of	the	cyber	domain,	filling	in	the	blanks	and	
identifying	the	'monsters'	we	fear.	
	
This	is	an	innovative	project,	examining	empirical	data	drawn	from	respondents	across	the	discipline,	and	
offers	a	new	way	of	examining	the	challenges	we	face.	It	allows	us	to	develop	a	more	accurate	picture	of	the	
threat	landscape,	and	to	evaluate	what	risks	we	may	be	ignoring.	
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1.	Introduction	
	
AUTHOR'S	NOTE:	This	paper	is	a	description	of	the	early	stages	of	an	ongoing	research	project;	given	the	
submission	deadline	for	the	conference,	what	follows	does	not	discuss	analysis	of	empirical	data,	and	will	
confine	itself	to	the	outlining	of	certain	initial	hypotheses.	By	the	time	of	the	ICCWS	conference,	it	will	be	
possible	to	present	the	first	stage	of	findings	and	analyses	of	the	pilot	study	discussed	in	Section	5	below	
	
By	its	very	nature,	the	online	environment	is	uniquely	vulnerable	to	harm;	before	ARPANET	had	even	been	
switched	on,	Willis	Ware	identified	the	ways	in	which	a	networked	system	is	inherently	and	inevitably	open	to	
attack	and	exfiltration	of	data	(Ware,	1967);	in	the	world	as	it	now	is,	the	situation	is	all	the	more	perilous.	
According	to	a	series	of	recent	reports	(Hau	et	al.,	2016;	Hewlett	Packard	Enterprise,	2016;	ISACA,	2015;	NCA	
Strategic	Cyber	Industry	Group,	2016),	both	risk	and	threat	are	expanding	at	a	frightening	rate,	as	a	direct	
result	of	the	ever-greater	embedding	of	IT	in	modern	life.	Attempts	to	establish	even	a	minimum	standard	of	
effective	cyber	security	are	further	hampered	by	the	reluctance	of	governments	and	companies	to	reveal	
breaches	of	their	networks	out	of	fear	of	reputational	damage,	and	the	scale	of	both	unreported	and	unknown	
events	(Barrett	2015).	Much	research	has	been	devoted	towards	establishing	a	clear	and	precise	taxonomy	of	
cyber	threat	and	risk	(see	Applegate	and	Stavrou,	2013;	Cebula	and	Young,	2010;	CESG,	2016;	ENISA,	2016;	
Gerić	and	Hutinski,	2007;	Jouini,	Ben	Arfa	Rabai	and	Khedri,	2015;	Marinos,	2016;	Simmons	et	al,	2014;	Zhu,	
Joseph	and	Sastry,	2011).	However,	such	an	approach	neglects	one	key	issue;	'risk',	'threat',	and	'vulnerability'	
are	not	monolithic	terms,	capable	of	only	one	interpretation	(TAG,	2010).	An	action	or	event	may	have	many	
different	'meanings',	depending	on	the	context	in	which	it	occurs.	Consider	the	action	of	accessing	online	
material	and/or	websites	which	are	judged	'inappropriate';	the	action	is	the	same	in	both	circumstances,	but	
the	nature	of	the	risk/threat	depends	on	the	specifics	of	the	situation	and	the	actors	involved;	an	employee	
accessing	Wikileaks	clearly	requires	a	very	different	response	from	a	teenager	surfing	websites	containing	
material	likely	to	radicalize.		Furthermore,	those	in	charge	of	cyber	security	at	a	national	level	are	generally	
those	with	the	least	technical	knowledge;	as	'Naughton's	Law'	puts	it,	"the	more	senior	the	cabinet	minister,	
government	official,	corporate	executive	or	judge	–	the	weaker	their	understanding	of	the	Internet	will	be"	
(Aldrich,	2012).	
	
This	paper	examines	cyber	risk	and	threat	in	ways	which	may	make	certain	readers	uncomfortable;	firstly,	it	
examines	human	factors,	rather	than	technology	(wetware,	rather	than	hardware	or	software),	and	secondly,	
it	investigates,	not	objective	data	such	as	event	logs,	but	subjective	data,	in	order	to	determine	the	extent	to	
which	cybersecurity	policy	is	shaped	by	belief,	and	whether	and	at	which	points	'expert	opinion'	shades	into	
'groupthink'.	Underlying	this	study	is	a	blended	methodology	which	enables	the	objective	analysis	of	such	
subjective	data.	This	is	entirely	fitting	with	the	domain,	for	'cyber'	has	been,	from	its	inception	in	the	work	of	
Wiener	and	above	all	the	multidisciplinary	Macy	Conferences,	a	truly	blended	discipline,	concerned	with	the	
interaction	of	Man	and	machine,	of	human	and	artificial	intelligence	(see	Dupuy,	2009;	Heims,	1991;	Pias,	
2016).	
	
Cyber	security	is	practiced	by	individual	actors	(licit	and	illicit),	whose	perception	of	events	is	inevitably	framed	
by	their	own	personal	opinions,	education	and	experience.	More	than	this,	each	actor	operates	within	a	
particular,	highly	specific	domain	-	technical,	political,	national...-	and	ascribes	to	a	set	of	values	unique	to	that	
domain.	All	areas	of	human	experience	are	governed	by	the	codes	and	ethics	(often	unconscious	and	
unspoken)	of	what	Haas	(1992)	terms	"epistemic	communities",	the	often	"unacknowledged	legislators"	(in	
Shelley's	phrase)	which	shape	our	apparently	independent	thoughts.	The	key	aspects	of	these	epistemic	
communities	are:	
	
(1)	a	shared	set	of	normative	and	principled	beliefs;		
(2)	shared	causal	beliefs;		
(3)	shared	notions	of	validity	
(4)	a	common	policy	enterprise	(Haas,	1992)	
	
It	is	entirely	reasonable	to	expect	that	any	group	of	individuals	dealing	with	similar	issues	and	experiencing	
similar	training	and	education	will	come	to	form	an	epistemic	community;	however,	over	time,	such	a	
community	can	become	trapped	in	ossified	thought	patterns	and	practices,	and	fall	prey	to	the	pressures	of	
"groupthink"	(Ricciuti,	2014a	and	2014b;	Rose,	2011;	Whyte,	1952).	The	dangers	of	this	in	a	continually	
expanding	and	evolving	domain	such	as	cyber	security	are	all	too	evident.	What	this	project	seeks	to	offer	is	a	
means	of	stepping	back	from	firefighting	and	the	enumeration	of	current	risks/threats,	and	to	examine	what	
practitioners	in	cyber	security	consider	what	may	lie	ahead,	as	a	means	of	evaluating	underlying	perceptions	in	
the	various	epistemic	communities	that	make	up	the	domain.	
	
There	will	be	those	who	will	have	difficulty	in	accepting	the	utility	of	studying	subjective	opinion;	however,	
there	is	a	long-established	tradition	of	empirically-driven	and	methodologically	robust	research	(inter	alia	
Botterill	and	Mazur,	2004;	Deery,	1999;	Kahan,	Jenkins-Smith	and	Braman,	2010;	Moussaïd,	Brighton,	and	
Gaissmaier,	2015;	Slovic,	1987	and	1993;	Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1974;	Vasvári,	2015;	Weber	and	Hsee,	1998)	
which	demonstrates	that	the	evaluation	of	risk/threat	is	inherently	a	subjective	act,	resting	on	preconception,	
individual	knowledge	and	epistemic	values.	As	Slovic's	(1993)	landmark	paper	puts	it:	
	
there	is	no	such	thing	as	‘real	risk’	or	‘objective	risk.’	The	nuclear	engineer’s	probabilistic	risk	estimate	
for	a	nuclear	accident	or	the	toxicologist’s	quantitative	estimate	of	a	chemical’s	carcinogenic	risk	are	
both	based	on	theoretical	models,	whose	structure	is	subjective	and	assumption-laden,	and	whose	
inputs	are	dependent	on	judgement.	
	
Human	factor	research	in	cyber	security	must	examine	the	users	and	the	attackers	of	systems;	it	must	also	
consider	the	opinions	and	attitudes	of	those	who	design	and	administer	those	systems.	
	
2.	Project	Overview	
	
"Our	enemies	are	innovative	and	resourceful.		And	so	are	we.	They	never	stop	thinking	about	new	ways	
to	harm	our	country	and	our	people.	And	neither	do	we."	(George	W.	Bush,	5	August	2004).	
	
President	Bush's	words	have	been	subject	to	criticism,	if	not	downright	ridicule;	however,	he	was	in	fact	
completely	right.	Any	effective	security	policy	must	be	driven,	not	just	by	what	we	know	to	be	the	case,	but	by	
the	consideration	of	what	could	happen.	The	aim	of	this	project	is	to	gain	a	clearer	picture	of	the	cyber	
threat/risk	landscape	as	perceived	by	stakeholders,	in	order	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	a	commonality	
of	perception	exists	(or	does	not	exist)	across	the	various	sub-domains	that	make	up	the	cyber	security	
environment.	We	wish,	in	effect,	to	ask	stakeholders	across	the	domain:	"What	keeps	you	awake	at	night?"	
(Some	informal	responses	are	given	by	Hoff,	2015,	Roman,	2015,	and	Stiennon,	2010.)	The	aim	is	to	construct	
a	database	of	'nightmare	scenarios'	as	envisaged	by	individuals	engaged	in	cyber	security	in	as	many	fields	as	
possible	(academia,	government,	the	military,	law	enforcement,	the	emergency	services,	finance	and	
commerce)	in	order	to	determine:	
	
a. whether	different	fields	perceive	a	differing	range	of	dangers,	or	if	there	is	a	common	set	of	perceived	
risks/threats	
b. whether	responses	differ	according	to	level	of	experience	in	specific	domains	(in	order	to	determine	
whether	the	growth	of	epistemic	communities	has	in	fact	led	to	'groupthink')	
c. whether	different	sectors	can	learn	from	each	other	in	terms	of	threat/risk	mitigation	and	prevention	
(professional	firewalls	may	lead	to	a	lack	of	shared	knowledge	and	good	practice)	
d. whether	significant	correlations	exist	between	perceived	threat/risk	and	specific	types	of	
stakeholders	(e.g.	are	less	experienced	actors	more	or	less	likely	to	perceive	original	dangers)	
	
Within	psychology,	much	work	has	been	done	on	developing	tools	for	recording	and	measuring	anxiety	in	
individuals,	such	as	the	widely-used	Fear	Survey	Schedule	for	Children	(Revised)	or	FSSC-R	(Ollendick,	1983).	
However,	simply	to	employ	a	modified	version	of	this	tool	is	not	judged	to	be	appropriate	in	this	case,	as	the	
FSSC-R	simply	lists	a	series	of	80	pre-existing	sources	of	anxiety	for	selection;	this	project	wants	to	elicit	the	
respondent's	own	entirely	personal	and	subjective	opinion,	as	far	as	possible	without	priming	or	leading	from	
the	questioner.	The	method	of	elicitation	used	here	will	hence	consist	of	an	anonymous	survey,	asking	the	
respondent	to	write	a	short	response	within	a	strictly	limited	time	period	(to	encourage	the	respondents	to	
answer	without	undue	reflection,	hence	reducing	the	risk	of	their	writing	what	they	calculate	to	be	the	'best'	
response	or	'what	they	should	write').	At	this	stage,	the	question	to	be	asked	is	"In	your	opinion,	what	is	the	
greatest	danger	we	face	in	cyber	security?"	
	
It	may	seem	that	a	project	such	as	this	veers	into	the	realm	of	individual	psychology	and	anxiety;	this	is	of	
course	exactly	the	point.	Cyber	security	is	concerned	less	with	facts	that	with	the	ways	in	which	those	facts	are	
interpreted	and	analysed	to	construct	strategy	and	policy.	It	is,	as	Myriam	Dunn	Cavelty	(2008)	clearly	shows,	a	
human	science,	shaped	by	issues	of	conflicting	political	and	ideological	discourses.	In	order	to	gain	a	better	
understanding	of	the	domain,	we	must	examine	what	we	talk	about	(or	do	not	talk	about),	and	the	ways	in	
which	we	talk	about	it.		
	
3.	Methodology	
	
This	project	seeks	to	elicit	from	respondents	a	personal,	subjective	and	unmediated	response	to	the	question	
"In	your	opinion,	what	is	the	greatest	danger	we	face	in	cyber	security?".	The	question	specifically	avoids	such	
terms	as	'risk',	'threat'	or	'vulnerability'	to	avoid	priming	respondents	to	answer	in	any	particular	way.	
Response	length	will	be	limited	to	100	words	maximum	(to	ensure	a	rapid,	concise	answer	without	overdue	
reflection)	and	gathered	in	the	first	instance	through	a	paper	survey,	headed	with	the	necessary	ethical	
caveats	and	declarations	(see	(4)	below).		
	
The	data	thus	obtained	will	then	be	analysed	as	discussed	below	in	order	to	determine	the	'dangers'	identified;	
these	will	form	a	basic	taxonomy	of	actions/events/actors,	which	will	be	mapped	against	the	existing	
taxonomies	cited	in	section	(1)	above,	in	order	to	determine	where	the	perceived	dangers	map	(or	do	not	
map)	against	extant	theoretical	models.	The	studies	of	threat/risk	taxonomy	cited	in	section	(1)	above	will	be	
vital	in	this	regard,	but	the	study	will	also	draw	on	extant	databases	of	real-time	contemporary	threats,	such	as	
the	RISI	Online	Incident	Database	(http://www.risidata.com/Database),	the	SYMANTEC	listing	of	threats	and	
risks	(https://www.symantec.com/security_response/landing/azlisting.jsp)	and	-	if	access	is	possible	-	the	
newly	constituted	ECB	real-time	cyber	threat	database	(Arnold,	2016)	
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	this	project	is	not	primarily	concerned	with	refining	existing	taxonomies	or	
developing	an	entirely	new	one,	but	with	mapping	participant	data	against	these	existing	models	to	see	the	
extent	to	which	the	two	datasets	do	(not)	match.	However,	a	possible	further	benefit	of	this	study	is	that	it	
may	in	fact	lead	to	a	more	accurate	modelling	of	cyber	threat/risk	and	a	more	detailed,	precise	taxonomical	
model,	both	through	the	process	of	existing	taxonomies	and	the	examination	of	perceived	dangers.	
	
This	analysis	will	gain	a	further	level	of	granularity	by	examining	the	responses	against	the	personal	data	
supplied	by	each	respondent,	in	order	to	determine	whether	any	meaningful	correlations	exist	between,	e.g.,	
nature	of	threat/risk	and	respondent's	domain	of	expertise.	As	stated	above,	the	specific	variables	the	initial	
project	will	be	recording	for	each	respondent	are		
	
a. domain	of	expertise;		
b. level	of	experience	(years	in	the	field);	
c. gender.			
	
At	a	theoretical	level,	the	aim	is	to	subject	subjective,	qualitative	data	to	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	
analysis,	adopting	a	blended	methodology	in	order	to	develop	a	fuller,	more	nuanced	understanding	than	
would	be	derived	from	a	unimethodological	approach.		
	
The	textual	material	obtained	from	the	survey	responses	will	be	subjected	to	two	specific	methods	of	linguistic	
enquiry.	Firstly,	critical	discourse	analysis	(CDA),	which,	as	Norman	Fairclough	(2015)	puts	it:	
	
combines	critique	of	discourse	and	explanation	of	how	it	figures	within	and	contributes	to	the	existing	
social	reality	
	
CDA	offers	a	way	of	examining	texts	as	a	means	of	revealing	their	underlying	sociocultural	and	ideological	
drivers	(such	as	those	which	form	the	underlying	presuppositions	of	an	epistemic	community),	and	can	be	
immensely	powerful	as	an	analytical	tool.	However,	one	of	the	great	dangers	of	CDA	is	that	it	can	lead	to	
analyses	which	are	a	priori	and	partial,	in	both	senses	of	the	term	(incomplete	and	prejudiced).	To	be	truly	
valuable,	and	to	defend	the	activity	against	accusations	of	unfounded	speculation,	CDA	must	be	grounded	in	
empirical	data,	and	base	its	conclusions	on	a	bedrock	of	testable	evidence.	
	
Such	evidence	can	be	provided	by	recourse	to	the	second	of	the	analytical	approaches	employed	here,	namely	
corpus	linguistics	(CL).	This	takes	a	text	or	texts,	which	form	the	corpus	to	be	investigated,	converts	them	to	a	
machine	–readable	form,	and	analyses	them	through	the	use	of	various	tools	in	order	to	reveal	significant	
details	concerning	word	frequency,	collocation	and	to	create	concordances	of	keyword	appearance.	What	
might	be	termed	the	“CDA	community”	has	shown	a	certain	reluctance	to	embrace	CL	(Fairclough,	2015:	21),	
but	it	can	and	should	be	seen	as	more	than	a	starting	point	for	enquiry,	rather	an	invaluable	and	inescapable	
part	of	the	process	of	a	data-driven	CDA.	The	approach	taken	here	follows	the	work	of	other	corpus	linguists,	
as	expressed	by	Baker	et	al.	(2008):	
	
to	show	that	neither	CDA	nor	CL	need	be	subservient	to	the	other	[…]	but	that	each	contributes	equally	
and	distinctly	to	a	methodological	synergy.	
	
In	the	first	instance,	as	outlined	in	(5)	below,	a	pilot	study	will	be	conducted	in	a	largely	homogenous	sample,	
drawn	from	a	single	domain,	and	the	results	derived	from	this	exercise	will	be	used:	
	
a. to	test	the	effectiveness	and	validity	of	the	experimental	approach	and	underlying	methodology	
b. to	establish	a	baseline	set	of	results/data.	
	
The	data	obtained	in	this	study	will	be	used	to	establish	a	reference	corpus,	against	which	further	studies	can	
be	measured,	in	order	to	determine	whether	stakeholders	do	in	fact	display	domain-specific	anxieties.	This	is	
where	the	ability	of	CL	to	perform	robust	analysis	of	keywords	is	vital.	(“A	keyword	may	be	defined	as	a	word	
which	occurs	with	unusual	frequency	in	a	given	text.	This	does	not	mean	high	frequency	but	unusual	
frequency,	by	comparison	with	a	reference	corpus	of	some	kind.”	(Scott,	1997)	A	helpful	discussion	of	the	
statistical	principles	underlying	calculations	of	keyness	is	Gabrielatos	and	Marchi,	2011).	
	
The	blended	approach	adopted	here	will,	it	is	believed,	allow	the	researchers	to	more	fully	assess	the	nature	of	
the	anxieties	driving	stakeholders	in	the	cyber	domain,	and	hence	lead	to	a	more	informed	discussion	of	how	
to	evaluate	and	assess	these	concerns.	However,	in	order	for	the	analysis	to	be	truly	successful	(and	in	fact	in	
order	that	the	research	may	actually	be	carried	out)	there	are	a	number	of	key	ethical	issues	that	must	be	
addressed.	
	
4.	Ethical	Concerns	
	
It	is	of	course	a	sine	qua	non	of	effective	research	that	it	be	carried	out	in	an	ethical	manner,	but	a	project	such	
as	this	requires	close	observation	of	and	adherence	to	a	number	of	pre-existing	codes	of	practice,	notably	
those	produced	by	JISC	(the	Joint	Information	Systems	Committee),	the	ESRC	(Economic	and	Social	Research	
Council),	and	the	British	Academy.	It	must	also	comply	with	certain	key	pieces	of	British	legislation	(most	
notably	the	Data	Protection	Act	1998).	In	order	to	address	these	issues,	the	following	steps	will	be	taken:	
	
a. Respondent	anonymity	will	be	strictly	preserved;	no	respondent	will	be	identifiable	by	name,	and	care	
will	be	taken	to	ensure	that	the	personal	data	collected	will	not	allow	the	identification	of	any	
individual.	
b. Right	of	withdrawal:	any	respondent	will	have	the	right	to	withdraw	from	the	survey	at	any	time,	and	
in	such	a	case,	their	data	will	be	destroyed.	
c. Respondents	will	have	the	right	to	enter	as	much	or	as	little	personal	data	as	they	wish	(e.g.	they	may	
choose	not	to	give	their	age,	gender,	or	domain/length	of	expertise);	while	this	reduces	the	
granularity	of	the	results	and	the	ability	to	determine	significant	correlations	between	response	and	
individual	characteristics,	it	does	mitigate	against	concerns	of	possible	identification.	
d. All	data	will	be	held	securely;	data	held	in	electronic	form	will	be	encrypted,	and	access	to	it	will	be	
limited	to	the	researcher.	
e. Any	published	data	will	undergo	a	further	process	of	review	to	ensure	that	confidentiality	and	
anonymity	guidelines	are	followed	scrupulously.	
	
Strict	adherence	to	the	existing	institutional	and	legislative	guidelines	hence	ensures	that	the	project	is	
conducted	as	it	should	be,	and	clear	signposting	of	the	processes	followed	(presented	to	respondents	as	a	
cover	sheet	to	the	survey)	will,	it	is	hoped,	help	to	ensure	as	full	and	honest	a	series	of	responses	as	possible.	
	
5.	Pilot	Study	
	
The	initial	pilot	survey	will	be	run	in	the	first	term	of	the	2016-2017	academic	year,	at	the	UK	university	at	
which	the	researcher	is	employed.	The	sample	group	will	consist	of	Undergraduate	and	Postgraduate	students	
and	teaching	staff	in	Computer	Science	(sample	size	≈	100).	This	group	has	been	selected	for	the	following	
reasons:	
	
a. They	all	have	a	level	of	knowledge	of	the	cyber	security	domain;	
b. They	have	differing	levels	of	experience	in	the	domain	(and	level	of	experience	is	one	of	the	key	
variables	under	investigation);	
c. There	will	be	both	male	and	female	respondents,	allowing	an	initial	examination	of	the	effect	(if	any)	
of	gender	on	responses;	
d. The	pilot	survey	can	be	run	with	large	groups	quickly	and	effectively	within	the	university	teaching	
schedule.	
	
6.	Next	Steps	
	
The	pilot	survey	outlined	above	will	allow	an	initial	ability	to	road-test	the	underlying	methodology,	and	to	
fine-tune	issues	such	as	question	wording.	It	will	also	provide	a	set	of	data	which	will	be	used	to	establish	a	
reference	corpus	and	initial	taxonomy	of	'dangers';	this	latter	point	is	itself	a	useful	research	topic,	in	that	it	
will	allow	the	project	to	determine	whether	the	existing	taxonomies	of	risk/threat	events	matches	with	the	
real	concerns	of	respondents.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	this	project	will	identify	issues	which	are	not	present	in	
existing	taxonomies,	or	which	need	to	be	prioritized	in	the	development	of	strategy	and	policy.	The	aim	is	that	
the	initial	results	and	analysis	will	be	discussed	at	the	2017	ICCWS	Conference	(which	will	also	offer	an	
opportunity	to	run	the	survey	among	a	population	which	is	both	large	and	highly	diverse).	
	
The	next	step	will	be	(mutatis	mutandis)	to	roll	the	survey	out	to	a	larger	and	wider	range	of	respondents,	and	
to	move	from	academia	to	other	sub-domains	within	the	field.	It	is	intended	that	the	second	run	of	the	survey	
will	be	conducted	at	a	workshop	in	January	of	2017	attended	by	stakeholders	in	the	field	drawn	from	the	UK	
public	and	private	sectors.	This	group	will	be	smaller	than	that	in	the	pilot	survey	(≈	50)	but	will	offer	a	
diversity	of	age	and	experience	across	differing	domains.	
	
The	project	will	give	a	clearer	picture	of	perceived	threats/risks	across	the	cyber	domain,	and		determine	areas	
of	vulnerability	which	are	as	yet	under-protected.	The	true	challenge	is	not	conducting	the	research,	but	
finding	ways	for	disseminating	the	findings	as	widely	as	possible	to	stakeholders.		It	is	believed	that	this	
research	is	of	value	not	just	in	itself,	but	as	a	way	of	driving	innovation	in	the	future	development	of	effective	
strategic	cyber	security	policy.	While	the	first	step	in	disseminating	the	findings	will	be	through	academic	
publishing,	the	ultimate	aim	is	to	determine	the	best	ways	of	sharing	the	data	with	as	many	practitioners	as	
possible.	
	
7.	Initial	Hypotheses	
	
"The	great	tragedy	of	science—the	slaying	of	a	beautiful	hypothesis	by	an	ugly	fact".	(Huxley,	1901).	
	
These	are	highly	provisional,	interim	hypotheses,	but	they	mark	out	the	initial	areas	of	interest.	As	with	all	
research,	they	are	constructed,	not	to	be	proved,	but	to	be	tested.	
	
a. The	null	hypothesis	(H0)	is	that	there	will	be	no	significant	differences	in	the	responses,	and	that	a	
common	series	of	risks/threats	will	be	identified.	
b. There	will	be	a	correlation	between	level	of	experience	and	technical	detail	of	the	'danger'	identified	
(i.e.	greater	experience	will	lead	to	a	greater	fixation	on	technicalities)	
c. Respondents	with	a	greater	degree	of	experience	will	display	a	greater	commonality	of	response	(the	
more	one	identifies	with	the	epistemic	community,	the	greater	the	'groupthink')	
d. Respondents	with	lower	levels	of	experience	will	display	a	greater	degree	of	originality	of	response	
('groupthink'	has	not	set	in)	
e. Gender	of	respondents	will	correlate	with	nature	of	threat/risk	identified	(allowing	initial	discussion	
of	the	nature	of	Computer	Science	as	a	'masculine'	subject	area;	see	Sax	et	al,	2015,	Stepulevage	and	
Plumeridge,	1998)	
	
These	hypotheses	set	out	the	starting	point	for	the	project;	it	is	expected	that	analysis	of	the	actual	data	will	
identify	many	further	avenues	for	research.	The	blended	methodology	outlined	here	is	portable,	and	can	be	
applied	in	fields	such	as	textual	attribution,	while	the	analytical	tools	also	hold	out	the	possibility	of	generating	
precisely	targeted,	linguistically,	epistemically	and	culturally	appropriate	tools	of	information	warfare	and	
counter-radicalization.	These	are,	however,	outside	the	current	realm	of	enquiry.	
	
8.	Conclusion	
	
As	stated	at	the	outset	of	this	paper,	the	cyber	realm	is	dangerous,	and	becoming	ever	more	so;	no	one	project	
can	hope	to	produce	a	completely	safe	world.	What	is	presented	here	is	a	first	step	to	examining	what	it	is	that	
stakeholders	in	the	field	actually	fear,	as	a	means	of	identifying	possible	areas	that	we	are	as	yet	not	engaging	
with.	This	project	is	an	exercise	in	mapping	the	cyber	landscape,	and	identifying	the	zones	marked	'Here	Be	
Monsters'.	By	the	end	of	even	the	pilot	stage	of	the	research,	it	is	believed	that	we	will	have	helped	to	reduce	
the	areas	of	the	map	consisting	of	blank	space	and	the	legend	'Terra	Incognita'.	
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